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Research on conflict resolution suggests that the significant risk of conflict recurrence in intra-
state conflicts is much reduced by political settlements that ‘resolve the issues at stake’ between 
parties to the conflict, and that in conflicts involving grievances about distribution of natural 
resource revenues, such settlements should include natural resource wealth-sharing 
arrangements.  This article shows that the Bougainville conflict origins involved far more 
complexity than natural resource revenue distribution grievances, and that the conflict itself then 
generated new sources of division and conflict, the same being true of both the peace process 
and the process to implement the Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA).  As a result, the BPA 
addresses many more issues than natural resource-related grievances.  Such considerations 
make it difficult to attribute lack of conflict recurrence to particular factors in the BPA.  While the 
BPA provisions on wealth-sharing address relations between the Papua New Guinea National 
Government and Bougainville, moves by the Autonomous Bougainville Government to explore 
possible resumption of large-scale mining has generated a new political economy in 
Bougainville, contributing to new tensions amongst Bougainvilleans. 
Most academic observers agree that the Bougainville conflict, 1988-97, 
would not have occurred but for the impacts of the huge Panguna copper 
and gold mine, operated in central Bougainville, 1972 to 1989, by Rio Tinto’s 
majority owned subsidiary, Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL).  Undoubtedly the 
dissatisfaction felt by many Bougainvilleans about the share of revenue 
received by not only customary landowners of mine lease areas, but also the 
wider population of Bougainville, was a significant factor in the origins of the 
conflict.  That view is reflected in the focus in observer accounts on the roles 
of Panguna mine lease landowners in the conflict origins, both those 
published soon after the conflict began,
1
 and more recently published 
accounts.
2
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In fact there were other groups involved, in various ways, in the origins of the 
conflict.  They included: young Bougainvillean workers employed by BCL; 
marginalised youth, particularly members of criminal (raskol) gangs, and 
unemployed young men with little or no formal education, from all parts of 
Bougainville; leaders of ‘pressure groups’ from areas facing intense land 
pressures and high levels of economic inequality, especially the Siwai and 
Bana areas, south-west of Panguna; leaders of indigenous political/religious 
movements; and elements of the main Christian churches in Bougainville.  
Further, while natural resource distribution issues were important, other 
significant causal factors were involved.
3
 
The conflict has more complex origins than has generally been understood 
and this helps to explain the apparent ease with which those that initiated the 
conflict were able to mobilise support across Bougainville.  It also helps to 
explain the multi-faceted character of the subsequent conflict, the peace 
process from 1997 till the signing of the Bougainville Peace Agreement 
(BPA) in 2001, and the implementation of the BPA, 2001 to present.  Once 
the conflict was under way, it generated its own dynamics, contributing to 
different sources of tension, division and conflict, and the same has been 
true of the peace process and the implementation of the BPA.  
The conflict’s complexity and intensity makes its lack of recurrence in the 
seventeen years since 1997 particularly notable, especially in light of 
research on the high risk of recurrence of intrastate conflict occurring since 
World War Two, 60 per cent recurring within five years of cessation of 
conflict.
4
  Recurrence is almost twice as fast (less than three years) for a 
particular category of conflicts involving natural resources—those involving 
natural resource distribution issues (unfair access to or control of resources, 
or unfair distribution of benefits).  Together, all categories of natural resource 
conflicts account for over 40 per cent of all intra-state conflict since World 
War Two,
5
 but it is only the 36 per cent of those that involve resource 
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distribution issues where the risk of much faster recurrence occurs.
6
  As for 
factors ameliorating recurrence risks, research highlights the roles of political 
settlements that ‘resolve the issues at stake’ between the parties to the 
conflict, and are guaranteed by the international community.
7
  Some suggest 
that settlements resolving ‘issues at stake’ in natural resource distribution 
conflict should include natural resource wealth sharing arrangements.
8
  
Even though they do not use the expression ‘natural resource distribution’, 
most commentators agree that factors consistent with the definition of that 
expression were involved in the Bougainville conflict, though many, but far 
from all, acknowledge it as one amongst other causes.  By the time the BPA 
was negotiated, the complexity of the conflict ensured that it was necessary 
to deal with many more issues than natural resource distribution.  In light of 
the literature just summarised, can we say whether by resolving ‘the issues 
at stake’ the BPA has played a significant role in reducing the risk of conflict 
recurrence in Bougainville?  
The high profile during the BPA negotiations of Bougainville secession 
issues and their possible resolution by a deferred referendum may help to 
explain why what the BPA says about mining revenue distribution has 
received little attention.  But given recognition of the importance of such 
issues in the conflict origins, it might be expected that the growing 
controversy since 2005 over the possibility of large-scale mining resuming in 
Bougainville would see more attention being given to such issues.  Contrary 
to views expressed by one international authority on conflict resolution, the 
BPA did deal with future control of mining in Bougainville,
9
 though it also 
deferred a decision on a key revenue distribution issue.
10
  
If Bougainville can indeed be categorised as a natural resource distribution 
conflict, or if distribution was an important factor amongst others, then the 
literature on risks of conflict recurrence just summarised highlights several 
                                                 
6
 Rustad and Binningsbo, ‘A Price Worth Fighting For?’. 
7
 Human Security Report Project, Human Security Report 2012, pp. 178, 184-5. 
8
 Helga Malmin Binningsbo and Siri Aas Rustad, ‘Sharing the Wealth: A Path to 
Peace or a Trail to Nowhere?’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, vol. 29 
(2012), pp. 547-66.  
9
 Zartman claims—incorrectly—that the key “to the last lock” on the Bougainville 
Peace Agreement (BPA) was “to put off a resolution … of the Panguna mine at 
Arawa”.  I. William Zartman, ‘Mediation and Conflict Resolution’, in Jacob Bercovitch, 
Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman (eds), The Sage Handbook of Conflict 
Resolution (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd, 2009), 
<http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/hdbk_conflictresolution/ 
n17.xml?f_0=SEARCHWITHIN&q_0=Bougainville> [Accessed 1 September 2014], p. 
330. 
10
 Anthony J. Regan. ‘Bougainville: Conflict Deferred?’, in Edward Aspinall, Robin 
Jeffery and Anthony J. Regan (eds), Diminishing Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific: 
Why Some Subside and Others Don’t (Oxford: Routledge, 2013), pp. 117-33. 
Anthony J. Regan 
- 74 - 
issues of possible significance.  They include whether mineral wealth sharing 
arrangements have played a role in reducing the risk of conflict recurrence.  
So in this article I examine the effectiveness of natural resource wealth 
sharing arrangements in the BPA, by outlining how ‘issues at stake’ were 
identified in the process of negotiating the BPA, and how resource 
distribution issues, in particular, were dealt with.  I then raise issues about 
the possibility that conflict recurrence risks may be rising, mainly as a result 
of the changing political economy of post-BPA Bougainville, generated in 
large part by debate on possible resumption of large-scale mining.  Before 
discussing those issues, it is helpful first to outline aspects of the dynamics 
generated by the conflict.  
Aspects of the Dynamics of the Conflict, 1988 to 1998  
While natural resource distribution issues were central amongst the 
multiplicity of issues and factors contributing to the origins of Bougainville 
conflict, from the outset they were mixed with others little discussed in most 
analyses.  They included: mine-workers’ perceptions of BCL’s unfairness as 
an employer; broad-based Bougainvillean resentment of outsiders generally, 
and of their domination of the economy in particular; localised economic 
inequality; and concerns of marginalised youth in many parts of Bougainville.  
Resentment of inequality was a cross-cutting theme, and one closely linked 
to rejection by emerging younger generation leaders of then existing 
leadership.  It was a significant factor influencing the actions of the mine 
lease landowners, the marginalised youth, and the Siwai and Bana pressure 
groups, and was a contributing factor to the actions of the young 
Bougainvillean mine-workers.  
Further, the generally young generation males (aged in their late teens and 
twenties) in the emerging BRA derived considerable legitimacy by the BRA 
being able not only to link itself to the generally older generation leaders of 
the indigenous political/religious movements, who tended to appeal heavily 
to tradition and custom, but also the main Christian churches.  Claiming 
legitimacy from a combination of custom and Christianity was a powerful 
mobilising influence in Bougainville. 
With multiple factors motivating a wide variety of loosely linked 
Bougainvillean actors, and some of those factors involving highly localised 
issues, it is hardly surprising that multiple agendas were pursued, especially 
after withdrawal of Papua New Guinea (PNG) forces from Bougainville after 
the March 1990 ceasefire.  It is also not surprising that a degree of 
‘levelling’—of the wealthy, the educated and the powerful—was pursued by 
some BRA elements.  Even officers of the North Solomons Provincial 
Government were targeted in the weeks after March 1990. 
After departure of the PNG forces, the main focus that had held the loosely 
structured BRA elements together was gone.  There was little discipline 
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amongst many localised BRA elements, particularly (but not only) amongst 
those with a history of raskol gang involvement, as is made clear by 
descriptions from Sam Kauona
11
 and James Tanis (former BRA commander, 
and late—2009-10—President of Bougainville).
12
  One of the tragedies of the 
appalling violence unleashed against Bougainvilleans by the PNG security 
forces from December 1988 was that it gave licence to some of their 
Bougainvillean opponents to match their violence.  Much of that was 
unleashed on non-Bougainvilleans, as well as on some elite, educated or 
powerful Bougainvilleans.  Violence, and fear of violence, against non-
Bougainvilleans saw most depart Bougainville during the second half of 1989 
and the first half of 1990.  There was effectively a form of ethnic cleansing of 
non-Bougainvilleans, who were targeted not just because of ethnicity, but 
also because of their roles in the economy.  The Chinese community, for 
example, was resented because of their control of much of the urban retail 
sector, and as a result their departure was—and still is—widely welcomed by 
Bougainvilleans.
13
  Many educated or elite Bougainvilleans also departed, 
both in 1989-90, and in later years, and in large part because of this there is 
a Bougainvillean diaspora of perhaps 20,000 mainly living elsewhere in 
PNG. 
With BRA leadership unity under pressure, localised leadership divided, and 
all pre-existing formal government ceasing to operate, from March 1990, 
localised conflict emerged in many areas.  Groups facing insecurity in such 
conflict appealed to PNG forces to assist them, that being a major factor in 
those forces gaining some control of significant parts of Bougainville 
beginning with Buka in late 1990.  After the return of PNG forces to Buka 
and parts of Bougainville Island in the late 1990 to mid-1992 period, 
Bougainvillean opposition to Ona and the BRA consolidated around the 
PNG-supported Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF), mostly former BRA 
elements.  In areas where PNG forces returned, local customary leadership 
and new local government bodies established under PNG law (regional 
interim authorities) worked closely with PNG forces and the BRF.  An 
alternative Bougainville leadership emerged in opposition to the BRA, and its 
government arm, the Bougainville Interim Government.  This alternative 
leadership generally opposed independence for Bougainville not because 
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they opposed it in principle but rather because of fear of independence 
under the BRA.  Such division within the Bougainville leadership added 
complexity to efforts to begin the peace process. 
These dynamics were at the heart of the emergence and escalation of 
localised violent conflict, 1990-97, something in many ways distinct from the 
secessionist rebellion fought by the BRA against PNG.  It was ultimately 
concerns amongst ‘moderate’ elements in the leadership on both of the main 
‘sides’ of the increasingly violent divide amongst Bougainvilleans about the 
long-term impacts on Bougainville of internal divisions that prompted 
exploration of options for peaceful resolution of the conflict, beginning in late 
1994 and 1995.
14
  Ona was initially uncertain about the peace initiative that 
began mid-1997, but by early 1998 he decided to oppose it, and announced 
Bougainville’s continued independence, now as the Republic of Me’ekamui.  
He was supported by some BRA elements (10 to 15 per cent of the former 
BRA) that then became the Me’ekamui Defence Force (MDF).  While the 
area around the former Panguna mine was his main area of control, Ona 
also continued to have mainly small areas of majority support scattered 
through various parts of Bougainville. 
Natural Resource Distribution  
as an ‘Issue at Stake’ in the 2001 Peace Agreement 
Given the multiple factors contributing to the origins of the conflict, and the 
complex dynamics of both the conflict and the peace process that produced 
the BPA, if the Agreement was to attempt to ‘resolve the issues at stake’, it 
needed to deal with a multiplicity of issues.  Given the history of mining in 
Bougainville, it is no surprise that the focus of BPA provisions on mining, as 
with most issues, was on dealing with differences between PNG and 
Bougainville.  That is not to say that the Bougainvillean negotiators did not 
recognise the need to manage divisions amongst Bougainvilleans.  
However, for the most part they put a great deal of faith in their future ability 
to manage such divisions through their own democratic institutions, 
established initially under autonomy arrangements, and perhaps in the long 
term under their own independent state. 
THE 1999 INTRA-BOUGAINVILLE NEGOTIATIONS  
ON A JOINT BOUGAINVILLE NEGOTIATING POSITION 
In mid-1999, two years into the peace process, Bougainville factions bitterly 
opposed during the conflict had built trust sufficiently to negotiate together to 
develop a joint negotiating position on a possible political settlement with 
PNG that they presented to PNG negotiators on 30 June 1999.  It largely set 
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the agenda for the entire negotiation over the next twenty-six months.
15
  The 
Bougainville parties generally adhered to their initial position, and although 
some significant compromises were made, by the time the BPA was signed 
they felt it largely reflected their initial position.  So when considering what 
was intended by the BPA provisions on mining, it is reasonable to look at the 
considerations the Bougainvilleans took into account before the negotiations 
began.  
The Bougainville leadership debated and approved their joint negotiating 
position earlier in June 1999 after considering the advice of a technical team 
comprising advisers to all participating Bougainville factions.  A discussion 
paper identified nine main options for Bougainville’s future political status, 
ranging from immediate and unilateral secession to accepting the status of 
an existing province within PNG, and proposed a basis for evaluating each 
option in terms of how well it met post-conflict Bougainville’s special needs.
16
  
Twenty basic issues facing Bougainville that needed to be taken into account 
in choosing the most appropriate future political arrangements were 
identified. 
After assessing how well each of those nine options met Bougainville’s 
needs, the leaders assessed a mid-range option as most likely to meet 
them—it was the combination of a deferred referendum on independence 
with high autonomy to apply until the referendum was held.  To understand 
what went into what was ultimately included in the BPA in relation to mining, 
it is necessary to consider the mining-related aspects of the summary of 
basic issues facing Bougainville used by the negotiators in their assessment 
process.  
THE ISSUES INFLUENCING  
THE JOINT BOUGAINVILLE POSITION ON MINING ISSUES 
Five categories of issues were identified, four of them including natural 
resource distribution-related issues.  The category ‘factors contributing to the 
civil war’ included issues related to the “basic grievances” felt by 
Bougainvilleans including the imposition of the Panguna mine by the 
Australian colonial regime, and its impacts on Bougainville culture and “the 
distribution of mining revenue”.  The category ‘special needs of Bougainville 
arising from the war’ included destruction of Bougainville’s infrastructure and 
economic base.  The category ‘emergence [amongst Bougainvilleans, during 
the peace process] on ways ahead’ included the issue of Bougainvilleans’ 
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long-advanced demands for “empowerment for themselves in decision-
making on matters most affecting them”.  The category ‘major constraints 
(administration, financial and others)’ included two particularly significant 
issues.  One concerned Bougainville’s “weak economic base”, it being noted 
that: “The closure of the Panguna mine and loss of associated businesses, 
and destruction caused by the war, have all severely weakened 
Bougainville’s once strong economic base”.  The other concerned a “lack of 
mining revenue”, it being noted that: “Because there is little chance of the 
Panguna mine or other large-scale mining operations opening for the 
foreseeable future, Bougainville’s government revenues are likely to be 
limited” (emphasis added). 
There were good reasons for the Bougainvillean negotiators’ view that there 
was little prospect for large-scale mining resuming and providing much 
needed revenue.  In 1999, two years into the peace process, little had been 
done to restore the infrastructure almost totally destroyed during the conflict.  
Most roads were almost impassable.  There was no telephone 
communication or electric power in most centres.  The three main urban 
centres associated with the Panguna mine (Kieta, Toniva and Panguna) had 
been destroyed, and much of Bougainville’s former main mining town and 
capital, Arawa, was destroyed or damaged.  Most Panguna mine 
infrastructure had been destroyed, and the area around the mine was a ‘no-
go-zone’, where access was very limited, controlled by roadblocks mounted 
by armed MDF elements.
17
  It seemed unlikely that either any future 
Bougainville government or mining investor (whether BCL or anyone else) 
would be in a position to consider large-scale mining for many years.  In 
relation to future Bougainville governments, in particular, there was 
consensus that large-scale mining could resume only if the leadership 
became more united around an agreed policy, and if significant restoration 
could first occur. 
THE BPA PROVISIONS  
ON MINING, AND ON MINING REVENUE DISTRIBUTION 
But none of this meant that issues about mining and the distribution of 
mining revenue were ignored in the BPA.  They were included in two main 
ways in the complex autonomy arrangements in the BPA, as well as in the 
PNG constitutional laws that gave effect to the Agreement.  First, the wide 
ranging powers made available to be transferred from PNG to the 
Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) at ABG request included 
“mining”, “land and natural resources”, “oil and gas”, “water resources”, and 
“environment”.
18
  Unlike some other powers made available to the ABG, 
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there is no qualification to any of these powers.  It is no surprise that in 
pursuit of the goal of Bougainvilleans having “decision-making authority” on 
matters most affecting them (above), that the ABG’s earliest requests for 
transfer of powers involved mining, oil and gas.  There is no doubt that when 
a power such as ‘mining’ is transferred to the ABG that it has full authority to 
make legislation on the subject to the exclusion of inconsistent PNG law. 
As for the distribution of revenues from large-scale mining, the BPA financial 
arrangements ensure that most sources of mining revenue are controlled, or 
received, by Bougainville.  However, the BPA also defers negotiation 
between the two governments on a decision on a significant aspect of 
revenue distribution.  
Bougainville’s negotiators accepted that the ABG would need to rely heavily 
on PNG grants, at least until large-scale mining became possible, or the 
economy was transformed in some other unforeseen manner.  PNG 
accepted not only that Bougainville should pursue the long-term goal of fiscal 
self-reliance, but also that all tax revenue collected in Bougainville should go 
to the ABG.  In the interests of maintaining a single national economy, 
however, PNG insisted on retaining control of Bougainville revenue from 
three key taxes—company tax, customs duties, and goods and services 
taxes—to be credited against the main PNG grant paid to the ABG (to meet 
the recurrent costs of ABG activities).  All other taxes would be 
Bougainville’s to determine and collect, including mining royalties.  Even 
personal income tax would belong to Bougainville (subject to PNG initially 
having power to collect it in Bougainville and remitting it annually to the 
ABG).  These arrangements put significant aspects of potential mining 
revenue under ABG control, including royalties, personal income tax and 
possibly dividends.
19
 
A key natural resource revenue distribution issue was deferred till later by 
virtue of the BPA providing that when revenue collected in Bougainville from 
company tax, customs duties and goods and services taxes (GST) is 
sustainably greater than the cost to PNG of the main annual grant to the 
ABG—the Recurrent Grant—then Bougainville achieves ‘fiscal self-reliance’.  
At that point the two governments are to negotiate the distribution of the 
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amount of tax from the same sources above the cost of the Grant.  The 
Recurrent Grant meets the costs of the activities carried out by the ABG, and 
as new powers are transferred to the ABG, the base amount of that grant 
(which is adjusted upwards annually in accordance with the BPA) rises.  In 
2014 the amount of the grant is K93 million, many times more than the 
amount of company tax, customs duties and GST currently collected in 
Bougainville.  PNG insisted that any tax revenues from those sources 
additional to the cost of the Recurrent Grant should be shared, on the basis 
that as part of PNG, Bougainville should contribute to the costs of services it 
receives from PNG (foreign affairs, security, etc.).  
It was recognised, however, that the ABG will only ever be likely to achieve 
‘fiscal self-reliance’, and the need to negotiate distribution of the tax revenue 
additional to the Recurrent Grant arise, if large-scale mining resumes in 
Bougainville.  That would certainly occur if the Panguna mine re-opens, and 
would probably occur too in case of any other large-scale mining project.  At 
that point, Bougainville would still receive the bulk of the tax revenue in 
question (through the Recurrent Grant), and so the amount the subject of 
negotiation would be limited.  
The Bougainville negotiators agreed to defer negotiation of this issue in part 
because it was under discussion in March 2001, almost two years after the 
negotiations had commenced, and the Bougainville negotiators were 
becoming exhausted.  Negotiations on the most difficult and contentious 
issue, the arrangements on the referendum on independence, had almost 
caused deadlock and collapse of the negotiations late in 2000, and had been 
successfully resolved.  Pro-secession negotiators tended to feel that with 
their main issue resolved, that details of the autonomy arrangements should 
not bog them down.  Influencing their attitudes in this regard was their 
common assessment that it was most unlikely that large-scale mining would 
resume for many years.  Most assumed that would be unlikely before the 
referendum was held.  As the pro-secessionists assumed that the 
referendum would result in independence, they also assumed that it was 
unlikely that the negotiation on distribution of the revenue would be required. 
Implementing the BPA: The Changing  
Political Economy of Post-conflict Bougainville 
In this section, I examine the ways issues about large-scale mining and 
control of mining revenue distribution have arisen and have so far played out 
in Bougainville since the BPA was signed.  Initial issues mainly related to the 
ABG taking control of mining powers.  But the resumption of large-scale 
mining started to become a real possibility much earlier than had been 
assumed was possible by Bougainville’s negotiators when the BPA was 
being negotiated.  This was in large part due to restoration of infrastructure 
and the economy progressing quite well, and in part to much improved 
access to the Panguna area from 2006-07.  Further, the realities of heavy 
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ABG financial dependence on PNG prompted much greater interest in ABG 
access to mining revenues.  Once those possibilities were being explored, 
the key issues rapidly centred on who would control and benefit financially 
from mining.  
From that point the key tensions on natural resource distribution were no 
longer between Bougainville and PNG.  Rather, they involved contending 
Bougainvillean interests.  This was precisely because powers on mining and 
control of most significant mining revenues were now in the hands of 
Bougainville.  In turn, it is that change that has transformed Bougainville’s 
political economy.  In the ABG’s early stages (2005-08), its central focus was 
on possibilities of new mining, elsewhere than at Panguna.  But since about 
2010, the main focus has been on possible re-opening of Panguna, mainly 
because if that were to occur, it could be a source of significant revenue 
(associated with personal income tax for workers involved in reconstruction) 
even before 2020, while experience elsewhere in PNG suggests any 
completely new mining project would be likely to take between fifteen and 
thirty years to open.  For an ABG struggling with a PNG government over the 
implementation of the BPA financial provisions,
20
 it has seemed clear that it 
needs access to significant untied revenues if it is to achieve either real 
autonomy of independence.  
But public debate on the possibilities of re-opening Panguna have been 
complicated because of the activities of several distinct sets of outside 
interests, each with Bougainvillean partners, seeking to gain economic 
advantage before the ABG makes mining policy and develops real capacity 
to control the mining sector.  Some seek to block Panguna for fear its re-
opening will limit their opportunities, while others seek to ensure Panguna re-
opens only in ways that benefit them.  A further complication involves the 
engagement in the debate of elements of the activist community in PNG and 
Australia, which are supporting those same interest groups, many of them 
apparently without understanding the complexities of the situation facing the 
ABG. 
ASPECTS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT IN 2014 
Accurate population figures for Bougainville in 2014 are not readily available, 
but the most commonly cited estimate is in excess of 300,000 (some 
suggesting as many as 350,000), suggesting the population has more than 
doubled since the conflict.  There seems little doubt, on the basis of 
observation and of extensive anecdotal evidence, that birth rates rose 
significantly from about 1990. 
Infrastructure and economic recovery expenditure (mainly by donors) has 
facilitated the re-establishing of Bougainville’s significant small-holder cocoa 
industry, which generates about K180 million per year.  The next most 
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significant industry is artisanal gold-mining, an industry that began only in the 
late 1990s.  Anecdotal evidence suggests a production value of perhaps K75 
million in 2014, most going to as many as 5,000 or 6,000 miners.  There are 
various other smaller industries, the largest of which is copra.  Significant 
donor expenditure continuing since the late 1990s, increasing levels of ABG 
expenditure, and gradually increasing incomes for many since the late 1990s 
due to cocoa and artisanal gold production have helped create many other 
business opportunities, e.g. in transport, fuel supplies, guest houses, 
supermarkets and trade stores.  
The geographic spread of cocoa and small-scale gold production is uneven, 
contributing to considerable and economic inequality, with wealth 
concentrated in and around main urban centres, notably Buka and Arawa.  
Cocoa production is particularly concentrated in north and parts of central 
and south-west Bougainville, and less so in densely populated Buin, where 
high rainfall problems have long limited cocoa production.  Small-scale gold 
production occurs in close to forty sites, concentrated mainly in central 
Bougainville, and on the tailings produced by the Panguna mine and 
dumped in the Kawerong-Jaba rivers system, where as many as 1,000 to 
1,500 people pan for gold on any given day.  Population and land pressures 
drive significant internal migration, both within and between regions.  Intra-
region migration occurs especially from south and south-west Bougainville to 
informal settlements along the Jaba-Kawerong rivers.  Inter-region migration 
is on a greater scale, especially from densely populated, land stressed south 
Bougainville, where economic opportunities are limited, to north Bougainville, 
where employment and informal economy opportunities are greater, and 
where people are buying or renting former expatriate-owned plantation land 
from the original customary owners of such land.  Internal migration is 
contributing to inter-communal tensions and conflict, especially in some 
areas. 
The proportion of youth in the population, and of youth with little or no formal 
education, may well be higher than was demonstrated by analysis 
undertaken by the North Solomons Provincial Government in 1986.  It 
showed that in 1985, 70 per cent of the almost 150,000 people in 
Bougainville were under twenty-six years of age, with 33 per cent classified 
as ‘youth’, aged twelve to twenty-five years.  More important, 25 per cent of 
youth had no formal education, while 57 per cent had no more than varying 
numbers of years of primary school education.
21
  In other words, 82 per cent 
had no education beyond primary school. 
The proportion of youth with no education or only primary school education 
is probably higher in 2014, as a result of disruptions to education caused by 
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the conflict, the closing down of government services from March 1990, and 
the blockade imposed by PNG on Bougainville from May 1990 (even though 
services did return to large parts of areas under PNG control starting from 
1991).  In particular, anecdotal evidence indicates a likelihood of significantly 
higher levels of illiterate youth, at a time when formal sector employment 
opportunities are far more limited than they were before the conflict.  
Moreover, land pressures originating in a combination of rising populations 
and rapid expansion of small-holder cash cropping in much of Bougainville 
from the early 1960s
22
 contributed to increasing land pressures and growing 
but uneven inequality in various parts of Bougainville pre-conflict.
23
  They 
were a far from insignificant factor in origins of the conflict, and have become 
far more intense since the late 1990s.  Factors involved here include both 
even more rapid population growth, and a dramatic expansion of small-
holder cocoa since the late 1990s.  There is increasing evidence of 
involvement of young males in criminal gangs.  Marginalised young men are 
the main sources of recruits into Me’ekamui Defence Force elements in 
central and south Bougainville.  In general, there must be concern that the 
situation with marginalisation of youth is remarkably similar, though quite 
likely worse, than that existing in 1988, which undoubtedly had impacts on 
the origins of the conflict. 
Former combatants (BRA and BRF, and some MDF), who were teenagers 
and young men when the conflict began, are now in their forties.  Many are 
involved in small businesses of one kind or another.  Just a few senior 
former combatants have become heavily involved in a wide range of 
business activities.  Inevitably their status as heads of networks of former 
fighters, well known, or generally believed, to still control, and—in some 
cases—make use of weapons (inclusive of ‘informal’ law and order support, 
and ‘localised conflict ending’ actions of various kinds).  Business success of 
some of the senior leaders has been assisted by access to both government 
and donor funds during and since the peace process.  Several have become 
significant business figures in urban centres, though claims that they have 
become “warlords”, heading “street gangs”
24
 are quite erroneous.  
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Several sets of economic enterprises conducted by Bougainvilleans rely 
heavily on control of weapons to operate.  Amongst the most significant is 
that of major Ponzi scheme operator, Noah Musingku, who relies on armed 
former BRA and MDF elements to continue operating his extensive and 
increasingly international fraud network from Tonu, in south-west 
Bougainville.
25
  In the Konno area of south-east Bougainville, former BRA 
and MDF commander, Damien Koike, heads a group of as many as 400 
young men exploiting an alluvial gold resource with the assistance of hired 
earth-moving equipment, water pumps and a huge sluicing system built from 
bush materials and roofing iron.
26
 
ABG FINANCIAL DEPENDENCE ON THE GOVERNMENT OF PNG 
It took longer than expected to achieve the initial stages of implementation of 
the BPA,
27
 and as a result, the members of the first ABG provided for under 
the BPA were sworn in only in June 2005.  In the intervening period of 
almost four years after the BPA was signed, the extent of tasks involved in 
re-establishing government services, infrastructure and the Bougainville 
economy became clearer, as did the reality of the uneven and limited 
capacity of the Bougainville Administration, and the almost total financial 
dependence on PNG (for grant revenue) and donors.  The interrelated 
capacity and fiscal dependence issues have continued ever since.  
The 2014 ABG budget provides for revenue and expenditure of K312 
million,
28
 of which about K34 million comes from Bougainville-derived 
revenue, compared to K268 million in PNG grants, and about K10 million in 
donor funds appropriated through the budget.  The fact that substantial 
additional donor funds—well in excess of K150 million—was spent without 
appropriation by the ABG only underlines further the extent of the fiscal 
dependence of the ABG.  PNG grants largely fund ABG recurrent costs, 
inclusive of delivery of basic services (including health and education).  
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Since 2001 donor funds have met most infrastructure and economic 
recovery costs (though since 2011, significant new PNG funding for major 
infrastructure projects has become available to the ABG).  The ABG has so 
far resisted any temptation to tax the small-holder cocoa and small-scale 
gold industries, mainly because they are putting income into the hands of 
rural Bougainvilleans.  Rather, its extremely limited tax revenues come from 
personal income tax paid in Bougainville, its 30 per cent share of PNG GST 
collected in Bougainville, and revenue from the few taxes and fees it 
imposes under its own laws (sales tax on liquor and tobacco, liquor-licensing 
fees, motor-vehicle registration fees, etc.). 
Limited revenues is a significant factor contributing to the ABG’s 
Administration’s limited capacity, but there are others.  They include the 
destruction as a result of the conflict of what had been quite impressive 
administrative and planning capacity under the North Solomons Provincial 
Government. 
The extent of reliance on PNG and donors is the main reason why the three 
elected Presidents of Bougainville, as heads of the ABG—Joseph Kabui 
mid-2005 to mid-2008, James Tanis, January 2009 to mid-2010, and John 
Momis, mid-2010 to present—have all supported resumption of large-scale 
mining as the most practicable way of achieving fiscal self-reliance for 
Bougainville.  
TRANSFER OF MINING POWERS TO THE ABG 
Kabui led the way, both in exploring arrangements for opening up large-
scale mining in areas other than Panguna (below), and in 2006, initiating the 
process for transfer from PNG of powers over mining, oil and gas.  There 
was initially some difficulty in agreeing with PNG the necessary 
arrangements under the BPA for developing plans to ensure that the ABG 
had the funds and other resources needed to exercise such powers 
effectively.  Negotiations in the period December 2007 to March 2008 
resolved those issues, mainly in relation to mining, with a gradual transfer 
process expected to culminate in the ABG developing its own mining policy 
and law within three or four years.  The Kabui Government also established 
the ABG mining department needed to administer mining powers as they 
were transferred.  
Before touching on the development of mining policy and law, it is necessary 
to outline issues arising from incursions into Bougainville by new foreign 
mining interests that began as early as 2005. 
THE CANADIAN CONNECTION: INVINCIBLE AND MORUMBI 
Possibilities of re-opening the Panguna mine continued to be remote in the 
first few years of the ABG, for although Francis Ona died suddenly in July 
2005, the ‘no-go-zone’ around Panguna initially continued in place.  In these 
circumstances, President Kabui was attracted by proposals from former 
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Australian, but now Canadian citizen, Lindsay Semple, the promoter of 
Canadian company, Invincible Resources Inc.  In conjunction with 
Bougainvillean partners, headed by former BRA ‘founding general’ (Sam 
Kauona), Semple convinced the ABG that he should be authorised to 
facilitate development of all major sectors of the Bougainville economy 
through revenues generated through a monopoly to be held by Bogenvil 
Resources Development Corporation (BRDC) over all mineral exploration 
and development in all parts of Bougainville other than Panguna.
29
  BRDC 
was initially to be 70 per cent owned by Invincible, with 15 per cent equity for 
the ABG, and the remaining 15 per cent divided between companies 
established to benefit former combatants (9 per cent) and un-named 
Bougainvillean ‘pioneer politicians’ (6 per cent), but Invincible’s equity might 
later be diluted.  BRDC would undertake all mining exploration and 
development work in partnership with the customary landowners of the area 
in question.  After Kabui’s sudden death in June 2008, Semple persuaded 
Invincible supporters in the ABG to pass an ABG law (drafted by Invincible’s 
lawyers, in Canada, with no input from the ABG Mining Department or Law 
Office) purporting to give statutory recognition to the BRDC arrangements.
30
  
These developments caused considerable controversy in Bougainville, 
where many felt that Semple, Invincible, and a small but mainly unidentified 
group of Bougainvilleans, would gain an unfair degree of control of, and 
financial benefits from, future large-scale mining.  James Tanis, who became 
President following Kabui’s death in mid-2008, did not support Invincible.  Its 
influence had largely ended by early 2010 when Invincible’s major 
shareholders ensured Semple’s links to the company were severed.  
Semple was soon back, however, this time with another Canadian company, 
Morumbi Resources Inc., a small oil producer in Canada that Semple 
convinced could make its fortune in Bougainville.  Working with 
Bougainvillean partners, Morumbi subsidiaries signed seven MOUs with 
different Bougainville landowner companies established by Morumbi and its 
Bougainvillean partners.  These MOUs purport to give Morumbi exclusive 
mineral exploration and development rights over large areas of Bougainville 
for up to fifty-five years.  The MOUs were signed with small groups of 
landowners, without authorisation from the bulk of landowners, many of 
whom complained bitterly to the ABG about the purported sale of their rights 
with no consultation or approval from them.  (The MOUs provided that the 
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full range of landowners would be identified by later social mapping 
exercises.)  
Semple and Kauona claimed that landowners were entitled to sign such 
agreements because section 23 of the Bougainville Constitution calls on the 
ABG to recognise landowners’ customary rights over minerals (if they exist) 
when making policy and law on mining.  These claims ignored not only the 
fact that section 23 is a non-justiciable ‘directive principle’, and so 
unenforceable in the courts, but also the grave practical problems that would 
be involved if landowners had unrestricted rights to deal direct with proposed 
explorers and developers.  In May 2012, Kauona and other Bougainvillean 
figures involved in Morumbi presented to the ABG a proposed Bougainville 
mining policy document which envisaged the ABG passing legislation before 
the end of 2012 that would give legal effect to the Morumbi MOUs.  They 
applied a considerable amount of public pressure for their policy to be 
adopted. 
ABG ASSERTS CONTROL 
By mid-2012, the ABG was so concerned about Morumbi’s activities that it 
decided to develop its own ‘transitional’ mining legislation.  It was to be 
‘transitional’ because the ABG Mining Department was already beginning 
work on the long-term exercise of developing a mining policy and legislation 
directed at meeting the particular needs of Bougainville and at the same time 
aiming to meet—or better—world’s best practice.  The ABG stated publicly 
that such a policy and law would replace the ‘transitional’ mining law as soon 
as it was complete.  
The ABG Cabinet gave instructions to develop the ‘transitional’ law using the 
existing PNG Mining Act as a starting point, but making significant changes.  
These included: recognising ownership of minerals by customary owners of 
land; giving the ABG authority to balance interests of resource owners and 
others by having authority over licensing and decisions on distribution of 
revenue; repealing the 2008 ABG Act recognising the BRDC arrangements; 
providing that the Morumbi MOUs would have no legal effect; continuing in 
operation the moratorium on mining exploration and development in 
Bougainville in place under PNG mining law since 1971, but requiring ABG 
Cabinet approval before it can be altered in any way; and limiting the number 
of major mines that can operate at any one time to no more than two.  The 
limit on major mines was included mainly because of concerns that the push 
from Morumbi for MOUs over many different parts of Bougainville could 
result in as many as six or seven major mines, with major social and 
environmental impacts, and immediate depletion of resources that should be 
reserved for future generations.  
DEBATING RE-OPENING THE PANGUNA MINE 
In the years after Ona’s death, the Me’ekamui Government’s leadership 
fragmented, and their popular support in the ‘no-go-zone’ around Panguna 
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waned, mainly due to lack of access of villagers to basic services.  Largely 
as a result, in August 2007, the leaders of a faction based at Panguna, 
calling itself the Me’ekamui Government of Unity, signed an agreement with 
the ABG
31
 directed towards, amongst other things, re-establishing 
government services at Panguna, a significant step towards achieving 
‘normalcy’ in this large area.  
Over the years since about 2000, a broadly representative mine lease area 
landowner committee had been exploring possible re-opening of the mine, 
and in consultation with that committee, the ABG decided to begin a wider 
public discussion of the issues involved from late 2009.  An extended 
process of direct consultation with the landowners of the areas covered by 
leases associated with the Panguna mine began in 2010.  In a series of 
public meetings held in the various lease areas in 2010 ABG officers 
emphasised that there would be no renewed mining without agreement of 
impacted landowners, a promise repeated publicly many times since by ABG 
President, John Momis.  The meetings demonstrated considerable support 
in the landowner communities for re-opening the mine, but only if it was 
under an entirely new and fair dispensation, where past wrongs were 
righted.  Re-opening was wanted both as the financial basis for possible 
independence, and also as the basis for economic development in the 
mountains around the mine, where few other economic activities were 
available.  
In the consultation process the landowners also indicated a wish to organise 
themselves to be represented in discussions of the future of the mine.  In a 
protracted consultation process, they decided to establish nine separate 
landowner associations, each to represent the interests of a distinct 
landowner group.  By March 2013, the associations were for the most part 
fully established, and elected executives began participating in a four party 
(ABG, PNG, BCL, as well as Landowners) Joint Panguna Negotiations 
Coordination Committee exploring preparation for possible negotiations on 
the future of Panguna.  Issues have included critically important things 
needed whether or not the mine re-opens, including chemical and 
environmental clean-ups and restoration of damaged land, rivers, etc.  
Amongst the landowners and the ABG there has been the beginning of 
discussions about whether, and on what basis, re-opening might be 
considered. 
PUBLIC CONSULTATION  
ON THE ‘TRANSITIONAL’ MINING BILL AND THE FUTURE OF PANGUNA 
Over the two years from mid-2012, in an effort to build consensus around its 
plans and mining policy proposals, and in order to gauge public views 
beyond the Panguna mine lease areas, the ABG conducted extensive public 
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consultations about the ‘transitional’ Mining Bill, the future of the Panguna 
mine, and the ‘long-term’ mining policy and law.  This work included 
conducting five large and open two day regional public forums (two in the 
north, two in the south and one in central Bougainville), similar forums for 
both former combatants and women nominated by a wide range of interest 
groups, as well as various other forms of consultation.  
There is no form of opinion polling done in Bougainville.  As a result it is 
difficult to gauge the reactions of the majority of ordinary Bougainvilleans to 
the intense debates about the future of mining and the ABG mining law.  
Further, the ability of both the ABG and its critics to communicate with much 
of the Bougainville population is severely restricted by radio broadcast 
coverage being restricted to about one sixth of the region’s area.  With over 
80 per cent of the population living in scattered rural hamlets and villages, 
and with road transport in many areas limited beyond trunk roads, even 
newspaper distribution is limited, and only limited numbers of people can 
attend public meetings.  So there is no doubt that complaints about 
consultation having been limited and some voices not having been heard are 
to some degree justified.  On the other hand, given the limited capacity and 
resources of the ABG, the extent of consultation has been considerable. 
PASSING THE ‘TRANSITIONAL’ ACT  
(AUGUST 2014) AND THE FUTURE OF THE ‘LONG-TERM’ ACT 
The ABG did not move precipitately to enact the ‘transitional’ law.  It was 
hoped that the pressures from Morumbi might dissipate, so that the ABG 
might be able to put the draft aside, and instead await the finalisation of the 
‘long-term’ Bill, expected to be ready for a public consultation and awareness 
exercise late in 2014.  These hopes were reinforced in November 2013, 
when a team of Canadian police and justice officials visited Bougainville to 
investigate possible breaches of Canadian anti-bribery laws by those 
involved with Invincible and Morumbi.
32
  From at least that point it became 
clear that Semple and Kauona no longer had Morumbi’s financial support, 
and their limited public support in Bougainville waned rapidly.  As a result, by 
December 2013, the key ABG ministers had more or less concluded they 
could put the ‘transitional’ mining law aside. 
Then in late January 2014, President Momis advised his Cabinet colleagues 
that in advance of an unexpected visit to Bougainville, the PNG Prime 
Minister had proposed to him that the PNG Government transfer to the ABG 
its 19.3 per cent equity in BCL, and at the same time move to take over Rio 
                                                 
32
 See Jo Chandler, ‘Canadian Mounties Investigating on Bougainville’, The Global 
Mail, 27 November 2013, <http://www.theglobalmail.org/feature/canadian-mounties-
investigating-on-bougainville/753/> [Accessed 31 August 2014]. 
Anthony J. Regan 
- 90 - 
Tinto’s shares in BCL.
33
  The possibility that this might happen had to be 
taken seriously, as the PNG Government had just made what was in some 
ways a similar move in relation to control of the Ok Tedi mine in the Western 
Province of PNG.  There was grave concern in the ABG about the way 
Bougainvilleans might react to such a move by PNG, which could involve 
PNG attempting to control future mining at Panguna.  
As a result, it was decided to press ahead immediately with preparing the 
draft ‘transitional’ Mining Bill for debate in the ABG legislature.  The final 
steps involved careful consultation through the Womens’ Mining Forum, 
attended by over 200 women leaders late in March 2014, and several 
consultative meetings in April 2014 with senior former combatant leaders, 
inclusive of Sam Kauona, where important changes were discussed to the 
draft clauses of the Bill that covered the transition of mining licences under 
PNG law to becoming licences operating under the new Bougainville law.  In 
the previous, July 2013 draft, the Bill had provided for the continued 
operation of the existing PNG law giving effect to the Bougainville Copper 
Agreement (BCA), under which BCL had previously operated in Bougainville, 
but only until any new agreement about Panguna was negotiated under the 
new ABG law.  But in the public consultations about the Bill, it had become 
clear to the ABG that while most Bougainvilleans preferred BCL to re-open 
Panguna (as the ‘devil they know’) rather than any new developer (a ‘new 
devil’) it was not acceptable to them for the first Bougainville mining law to 
give any form of recognition to the BCA, or to any mining exploration or 
development licences granted to BCL under the grossly unfair colonial 
mining law operating in the 1960.  As a result, the ABG directed significant 
changes that were approved by ABG Cabinet in early June 2014.  
Hence, the Bill introduced to the legislature on 6 August 2014 provided that 
the PNG law giving effect to the BCA would cease to operate in Bougainville 
when the ‘Transitional’ Act came into effect, meaning that all BCL’s licences 
would also cease to apply.  Instead, the draft Bill provided that BCL would 
have an Exploration Licence under the new ABG law over its previous 
Special Mining Lease, which meant it would have a right to negotiate, with 
both the ABG and mine lease landowners, for the grant of a mining licence 
over that area.  However, in addition, the President has also made it clear 
many times that there will be no renewed mining at Panguna unless the 
mine lease landowners agree. 
In any event, the Bougainville Mining (Transitional Arrangements) Act 2014, 
was passed by the ABG legislature on 8 August 2014.  The ABG Mining 
Department and other officers meanwhile continue work on development of 
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the ‘long-term’ Mining Bill, which it is hoped will be presented to the 
legislature in December 2014, or early in 2015. 
SOME POLITICAL ECONOMY IMPACTS  
The debates about the possibilities, first, from 2005, of exploration for and 
development of minerals in parts of Bougainville other than Panguna, and 
then from around 2009, of reopening Panguna, have had dramatic and 
largely unanticipated impacts on the political economy of Bougainville.  The 
ABG has pursued these possibilities only as means of achieving economic 
development, and providing the revenue needed for either real autonomy or 
independence.  But in pursuing them, new dynamics, tensions and divisions 
have emerged.  
In the absence of ABG mining policy and law, PNG mining law had no 
legitimacy in Bougainville.  Moreover, until very recently, the ABG had no 
capacity to regulate the mining sector.  The ABG also has limited capacity to 
administer and plan for Bougainville generally, has limited reach in most 
rural areas, and less in some areas under Me’ekamui leadership, or claimed 
to be controlled by Musingku.  In these circumstances it was easy for 
Semple, Invincible Resources, Morumbi Resources, and their Bougainvillean 
partners to seek legitimacy by misinterpretation of Bougainville Constitution 
guidance provisions on ownership of minerals as ‘cover’ for pursuit of power 
and/or wealth through control of mining in areas other than Panguna.  But 
these possibilities have receded as the ABG has not only moved ahead 
towards negotiations about the future of Panguna, but also developed its 
own mining legislation.  
In response, Semple and his Bougainvillean partners adopted the strategy of 
claiming that the ABG and its advisers had become agents of Rio Tinto and 
the Australian Government, and were working against the interests of 
Bougainville.  Their claims have been supported by three other main sets of 
interests, whose aims to control or access mining revenues, in various ways, 
have also been threatened by the ABG’s policies.
34
 
First, the leadership of the Me’ekamui Government of Unity, based at 
Panguna, also opposes the re-opening of Panguna, mainly because in the 
absence of large-scale mining there, the leaders have been entering, or 
attempting to enter, a range of agreements with foreign interests, in which 
they have purported to grant long-term rights over minerals in various parts 
of central Bougainville.
35
  Second, while the Member of PNG Parliament for 
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Central Bougainville, Hon. Jimmy Miringtoro, wants the Panguna mine to re-
open, he favours his own candidate company to replace BCL.
36
  Third, 
Lawrence Daveona, since mid-2013 the chair of the executive of the 
Panguna Special Mining Lease landowners association, has come under the 
influence of an adviser from the United States.  They too support Panguna 
re-opening, but oppose BCL, mainly on the basis that the adviser claims to 
be able to raise the approximately US$6 billion need to re-open the mine, 
which would permit the Panguna landowners to own the mine lease.  He has 
so far neglected to also advise on two key issues.  One is the fact that very 
few mining companies have the technology, machinery and management 
experience necessary to exploit the low-grade porphyry copper and gold 
deposit at Panguna, and that without one of those companies involved, the 
finance would not be forthcoming.  The other concerns the identity of his 
favoured operator, and his proposed relationship with that proposed 
operator. 
In the lead-up to the third ABG general elections, scheduled for April-May 
2015, the future of large-scale mining is a widely discussed issue in 
Bougainville, and one closely linked to the other major deeply divisive issue 
about which the BPA deferred consideration, namely Bougainville’s 
secession from PNG.  With the approach of the ‘window’—2015-20—within 
which the referendum on Bougainville’s future political status must be held, 
this election is increasingly seen as the most important ever in Bougainville.  
The reason is that it will determine the leadership that negotiates the 
referendum arrangements with PNG, and will determine what happens in 
relation to the future of large-scale mining.  Already, there are people 
proposing to stand for the Presidency on the basis of platforms related to 
mining.  In particular, Sam Kauona aims to do away with the Bougainville 
Mining (Transitional Arrangements) Act 2014, recently passed by the ABG.  
Ishmael Toroama, who succeeded Kauona as head of the BRA when 
Kauona undertook pilot training in New Zealand from 1999-2001, is also 
critical of the Act, amongst other things for its failure to recognise the need 
for former combatants’ rights to compensation.  
There is a great deal at stake for the various outside and Bougainvillean 
interests seeking to control the future of large-scale mining in various ways.  
Increasingly, outside economic interests are seeking to influence internal 
politics in Bougainville.  In a post-conflict situation, where many sources of 
tension and division remain unresolved, and where significant ‘militias’ 
remain armed, and have leaders with their own economic agendas, many 
Bougainvilleans fear that the potential for further division, conflict, and 
perhaps violence, is growing. 
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A CURIOUS ALLIANCE: NEW MINING INTERESTS, AND ACTIVISTS 
From early 2013, when public discussion first emerged about ABG 
development of ‘transitional’ mining legislations, a curious and perhaps to 
some extent unwitting ‘alliance’ developed between the outside mining 
interests and their Bougainvillean partners, on the one hand, and PNG and 
Australian activists on the other.  An escalating series of attacks was made 
on the ABG, its President, and its advisers as acting in the interests of Rio 
Tinto or BCL or Australia.  The attacks have been made mainly through two 
PNG blogs, PNG Mine Watch
37
 and PNG Exposed,
38
 as well as in comments 
on Bougainville-related posts on other PNG blogs,
39
 and on other forms of 
social media (such as the Bougainville Forum, on Facebook).
40
  
These attacks echo the claims against the ABG made by Semple, Morumbi, 
and Kauona and the other interests just outlined.  Indeed, much of it quotes 
Kauona or Miringtoro, or reproduces material that they have put out 
elsewhere.  While it is no surprise that the outside economic interest and 
their Bougainville partners take the line they do in attacking the ABG, it is a 
concern that their attacks are repeated, and even enlarged upon by activists, 
who might be expected to try to consider evidence before advancing such 
claims.  
The views of some key activists on what they regard as the evils of BCL’s 
roles in the 1988-90 period appear to blind them to the reality being faced by 
the ABG: the potentially very serious problems that could be caused for 
Bougainville if the various outside interests were to get the control of mining 
that they seek.  In circumstances where none of these activists have long 
and deep connections to Bougainville, nor detailed understanding of the 
current problems and pressures facing Bougainville, they have perhaps 
unwittingly developed alliances with outside interests seeking to get control 
of mining and mining revenues for their own benefit, and contrary to the 
interests of Bougainville. 
Conclusions 
Research on amelioration of conflict recurrence tends to assume it is mainly 
about resolving ‘the issues at stake’ in the correct manner.  But such 
research cannot, of course, deal with the difficulty of the task of those 
involved in negotiating peace settlements in defining and identifying not only 
those issues, but also the measures that will best ‘resolve’ them.  After all, a 
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long and violent conflict involving natural resource distribution issues is likely 
to also involve more complex causes and triggers.  It will generate its own 
dynamics, contributing to or creating new divisions, and new stakeholders 
and leaders will emerge.  Similar processes can be expected in relation to 
negotiating a settlement, and its implementation.  If natural resource 
distribution issues were a major factor in the origins of a conflict, they might 
not be a central focus in negotiating a post-conflict settlement.  But changing 
dynamics, and especially changes in political economy, may see natural 
resource distribution issues become significant again many years into the 
processes involved in implementing the settlement.  At this stage, though the 
risk of conflict recurrence may become much higher, the factors contributing 
to risk may have changed dramatically.  If so, then assessing conflict 
recurrence risk is not just about political settlements that ‘resolve the issues 
at stake’, but also about understanding the changing dynamics of conflicts, 
peace processes, and post-settlement implementation. 
On the basis of this case study of Bougainville, I conclude that natural 
resource distribution issues were a significant factor, amongst many others, 
in the origins of the conflict.  In addition, it was a factor that aggravated many 
other factors.  Moreover, many other divisions, sources of conflict and actual 
conflicts developed as a consequence of the dynamics of not only the 
conflict itself, but also of the peace process, and the process of 
implementing the BPA.  Indeed, the tensions developing over mining related 
issues since 2005 are emerging as part of the dynamics generated by 
implementing the BPA.  These are largely tensions internal to Bougainville.  
As a result, there is limited utility in the natural resource revenue distribution 
arrangements in the BPA, developed mainly to respond to the contribution of 
natural resource distribution issues to conflict between Bougainville and 
PNG.  On the other hand, natural resource distributions certainly were a 
significant source of conflict both between PNG and Bougainville, and 
amongst Bougainvilleans.  It was entirely reasonable for those negotiating 
for the BPA to include provisions intended to respond to the issues that had 
divided PNG and Bougainville in the 1980s, by giving the ABG power to 
determine mining policy and law for Bougainville, and to receive the major 
part of mining revenues.  But it was too difficult for them to tailor 
arrangements in 2001 that could realistically respond to natural resource 
distribution issues that had divided Bougainvilleans in the 1980s (mainly 
issues related to the inequitable distribution of the limited natural resources 
revenues then available to Bougainvilleans). 
In giving effect to its new right to make mining policy and law, the ABG has 
inadvertently helped generate a new political economy in Bougainville, 
where new outside interests in alliances with significant Bougainvillean 
interests, are engaging in a struggle for a significant degree of control over 
resource revenues and mining powers.  These developments have ensured 
that the main divisive issues relating to natural resource distribution are no 
longer between PNG and Bougainville, but are instead between 
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Bougainvilleans (as even the outside interests have no leverage without 
Bougainville partners).  The Bougainvillean negotiators for BPA did not 
include provision on dealing with such new sources of internal Bougainville 
tensions related to natural resource distribution, not only because they were 
not anticipated, but also because it would have been virtually impossible to 
do that at the time.  Rather, their key assumption was that by establishing a 
strong and legitimate autonomous government, thereby empowering 
“Bougainvilleans to solve their own problems, manage their own affairs and 
realize their own aspirations”, and with “sufficient personnel and financial 
resources … to exercise its powers and functions effectively”,
41
 there would 
be a Bougainville government body capable of developing policy broadly 
acceptable to all interests, and of dealing with disputes between Bougainville 
interests when they do arise. 
But at present, the ABG still has limited capacity, and developing appropriate 
mining policy and law takes time and resources, and implementing it 
effectively takes more.  Some of those attacking the ABG have strong 
interests in the ABG remaining weak.  Their increasingly strident attacks on 
the ABG are being made for the clear purpose of getting control of revenue 
and power.  There is a real political and economic struggle taking place, and 
the eventual outcomes are as yet far from clear.  One irony here is that the 
ABG is seeking mining revenue in order to build the capacity needed to 
achieve either real autonomy or independence, when there are now risks of 
serious tensions and disunity that could undermine Bougainville’s prospects 
for achieving either goal.  There are particular risks here given the ongoing 
presence of armed factions in Bougainville.  In these circumstances, there is 
an urgent need for the international community and the activist community to 
recognise where the real tensions and dangers of conflict lie. 
Whilst the current tensions concerning natural resource distribution are 
mainly within Bougainville, there are still possible sources of dispute 
between PNG and Bougainville.  One concerns possible difficulties in 
negotiating distribution of mining and other tax revenues additional to the 
recurrent grant should any future large-scale mining project result in those 
revenues being sustainably higher than the amount of the grant.  In relation 
to issues about the Panguna mine’s future, tensions could arise over various 
issues if in fact BCL were to be permitted to return, including over any move 
by PNG to expropriate Rio Tinto’s majority equity in BCL, and over any 
difference that might occur over the ABG’s entitlement to have the PNG 19.3 
per cent equity transferred. 
Turning, finally, to the risk of conflict recurrence in Bougainville, we can 
clearly set to one side the BPA provisions on mining.  The real questions 
now concern whether a strong and legitimate ABG can emerge that can 
manage the many sources of tension and conflict inherent in the 
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circumstances of post-conflict Bougainville, including those internal tensions 
concerning mining.  The difficulties for the ABG in managing such tensions 
are not small.  They include, in particular, the situation of marginalised youth, 
as we have seen, in so many ways so similar to the situation in Bougainville 
in the late 1980s.  The history of the conflict from 1988 demonstrates that 
sources of anger in such a significant marginalised group can be unleashed 
in unexpected ways, especially where contributed to, or aggravated, by 
natural resource distribution issues.  Discussing two natural resource related 
insurgencies in Nigeria, political geographer Michael J. Watts said: 
The energies unleashed … among a generation of marginalized youth is 
astonishing; the reservoirs of anger is [sic] now very deep having been filled 
by the waters of resentment over many decades.  That the resentments can 
and have been channelled into all manner of claims, aspirations and 
practices (complex mixtures of greed and grievance) the borders among 
which are labile and porous should surprise nobody.
42
 
If the struggle over control of mining in Bougainville continues, without the 
ABG’s authority being accepted, the outcomes will be unpredictable.  All 
points of tension and conflict involved in or arising from this struggle are 
likely to be intensified by the approach of first, the ABG general election, and 
second the referendum on independence, and by the intersections between 
the political and economic struggles associated with those processes, on the 
one hand, with the struggles over mining. 
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